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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

21467

December 5, 1989

**SIGNED**

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL/ARNOLD KANTER <sup>RB</sup> <sup>AK</sup>

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE <sup>CR</sup>

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting

The President has now committed himself to an ambitious arms control agenda before the June 1990 Summit. The goal of this NSC meeting is to make clear to the NSC his personal commitment to getting this work done and to repeat his comment to Gorbachev that bureaucracy must not get in the way of the completion of the treaties.

Your memorandum to the President is at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President  
Tab A Points to be Made  
Tab B List of Participants  
Tab C Agenda

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by R. Soubers, National Security Council

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 5, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE: December 5, 1989  
LOCATION: Cabinet Room  
TIME: 4:00 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

The goal of this meeting is to review commitments that you made to Gorbachev on arms control and to kick-start the bureaucracy to meet the timelines that you set for the 1990 Summit.

II. BACKGROUND

As a result of the Malta meeting, we have an ambitious arms control agenda ahead of us. There are a number of controversial START issues that must be resolved urgently if we are to complete the work on a variety of U.S. positions before Jim Baker's Ministerials -- the first of which is in less than eight weeks. In addition, as Dick Cheney and Collin Powell related last time, we also need to find a way to move CFE along. Finally, work is lagging on implementing your chemical weapons initiative.

The members of the NSC will need to hear from you the high priority that you place on meeting your commitments to Gorbachev, and that doing so will require their personal sustained involvement. As you told Gorbachev, you cannot afford to let the bureaucracy get in the way of meeting these timelines.

We came out of Malta with a lot of momentum and have laid to rest the notion -- for now -- that the Administration is dragging its feet and is unwilling to engage the Soviets. The critical foreign policy test before us now is to make certain that we do not lose that momentum and that the interagency process supports the effort to meet the commitments that you made to Gorbachev.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The list of participants is at Tab B.

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

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IV. PRESS PLAN

White House Photographer only.

V. SEQUENCE

Meeting

Attachments

Tab A Points to be Made  
Tab B List of Participants  
Tab C Agenda

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POINTS TO BE MADE AT MEETING OF THE NATIONAL  
SECURITY COUNCIL

- As you know I talked at the Cabinet Meeting in some detail about my meetings with Gorbachev and the follow-on discussions with the Allies.
- The purpose of this NSC meeting to emphasize that we must get the work done so that we can meet the timelines and commitments established at Malta.
- I proposed the following to Gorbachev on economic relations:
  - Immediate negotiation of a trade agreement so that when the Supreme Soviet codifies its emigration laws, I can waive Jackson-Vanik. I am aiming to be able to announce MFN status for the Soviet Union at the 1990 Summit.
  - I also proposed to Gorbachev that we discuss the development of a bilateral investment treaty.
- I informed the Soviets that I intend to tell the members of GATT now that I will support GATT observer status for the Soviet Union when the Uruguay Round is completed.
- I proposed expanding U.S.-Soviet technical economic cooperation and presented him with a paper proposing

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specific economic projects, covering topics such as finance, agriculture, statistics, small business development, budgetary and tax policy, a stock exchange, and anti-monopoly policy.

-- I told him that I would explore with Congress the lifting of statutory restrictions on export credits and guarantees after a Jackson-Vanik waiver is granted.

-- There is a lot of work to do to meet this agenda and Nick you will need to work with Jim Baker, Bob Mosbacher, Clayton and Carla to make sure that we are ready for 1990.

-- We have even tighter timelines on arms control:

-- We must meet the commitments that I made to Gorbachev to fill gaps in our arms control positions and be ready to engage in intense negotiations with Moscow on the unresolved issues.

-- I do not want inertia in the U.S. bureaucracy to be the cause of slippage in these timelines before the 1990 Summit.

-- I look to each of you to play sustained, active personal roles to insure that high quality work gets done on time.

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- I need to be able to make the necessary decisions so that we are well prepared for the upcoming Ministerials and the Summit.
  
- Obviously, we are not going to cave in on issues that are important to our security but I want to be sure that we make our best effort to get this done.
  
- I proposed to Gorbachev that we accelerate the START process in order to resolve all substantive issues and to conclude a treaty, if possible, by the 1990 Summit.
  
- When Jim Baker meets with Shevardnadze less than eight weeks from now, they are to work out agreements on ALCMs, non-deployed missiles and telemetry encryption.
  
- We also promised to table a position on most of the START issues by the time of that meeting and on all of them by the time of the next Ministerial.
  
- The agenda for chemical weapons and CFE is equally ambitious.
  
- I proposed speeding achievement of a chemical weapons ban and offered to end U.S. production of binary weapons when the multilateral convention on chemical weapons enters into force, in return for Soviet acceptance of the terms of our UN proposal to ban chemical weapons.

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- I suggested that we sign an agreement at the 1990 Summit to destroy U.S. and Soviet chemical weapons down to 20 percent of the current U.S. level.
  
- I proposed completing work on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) for signature at the 1990 Summit.
  
- <sup>o</sup> Finally, I suggested that the U.S. and Soviet Union support holding a CFE Summit to sign a CFE treaty in 1990.
  
- I have asked Brent to develop a detailed work program and some ideas for the best way to organize ourselves to meet these timelines.
  
- He will be getting both the work program and the ideas to you shortly.

PARTICIPANTS

The President  
The Vice President  
James A. Baker, Secretary of State  
Nicholas Brady, Secretary of Treasury  
Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense  
James A. Watkins, Secretary of Energy  
Richard Darman, Director of the Office of Management and Budget  
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security  
Affairs  
Judge William Webster, Director of Central Intelligence  
General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Ronald Lehman, Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
Robert Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National  
Security Affairs  
Arnold Kanter, Special Assistant to the President for Defense  
Policy/Arms Control

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